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Abstract: Malfunctions within commercial aircraft can considerably increase both the finan-
cial cost of downtime and the disruption caused to passenger travel. For this reason prompt
detection, diagnosis, and rectification of faults is imperative to the successful operation of such
a system. In this paper the fault diagnostic problem is tackled based on the application of the
digraph procedure. Digraphs model the information flow, and hence fault propagation, through
a system. A computational method has been successfully developed to conduct the fault
diagnostics process and produce a list of the fault combinations determined. The scope of the
method has been demonstrated by consideration of two modes of operation to the application
of a commercial aircraft fuel system, namely that of a Boeing 777. In addition the paper high-
lights the contribution of the development of a reduction method to enhance the likelihood of
identifying the possible failure causes in three ways from different viewpoints. The three
methods provide the option of determining the component at fault, the most probable failure
mode cause, and also evidence for a particular component fault.
Keywords: fault diagnostics, digraphs
1 INTRODUCTION
The occurrence of failures within a system can cause
disruption to the operational stability. Fault diag-
nosis has therefore become a primary objective in
engineering applications. It is concerned with the
isolation of underlying causal faults that can lead to
an observable effect in a monitored process. Effective
detection of system faults decreases downtime and
consequently enhances operational stability [1].
Traditional approaches employed to identify faults
involved using testing algorithms to detect single
failures [2, 3]. In using this approach, prospective
faults are highlighted through the running of a series
of tests at a particular point in time. The tests are
composed of symptoms that are related to specific
system faults. The effectiveness of the method has
been proven when determining single faults in a
system with a known period of inactivity. Difficulties
are noted when considering the complexities of
multiple fault combinations. In an effort to address
the diagnosis of multiple faults, extensions to the
sequential testing technique have been developed
and implemented [4].
Some recent approaches have used reliability
assessment tools such as failure modes and effects
analysis (FMEA) [5, 6] and fault tree analysis [7].
Attempts have been made to automate the FMEA
process and increase its effectiveness through
decreasing the time required for analysis. A different
method proposes translating the information con-
tained in a network of interconnected fault trees into
FMEA-style tables [8]. Variability in the performance
of these methods is noted with increased system
complexity.
Digraphs, also known as signed directed graphs
[9, 10], illustrate specific fault propagations through a
system. They are a type of causal model, clearly
representing the cause and effect behaviour within a
system. Causal models can be employed in fault
diagnosis to reason about the behaviour of processes
under normal and abnormal conditions [11].
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The characteristics associated with modern day
systems require fault diagnosis to incorporate both
adaptability and identification of multiple faults [12].
Modern systems are normally required to operate in
more than one mode. An ideal diagnostic procedure
would therefore incorporate an adaptable scope.
The research is centred on model-based diagnosis
which uses models of a device or system as a basis for
generating possible solutions for a given problem. A
model indicating the expected behaviour of the sys-
tem under a given set of operating conditions is cre-
ated. Retrieved readings from the system are then
compared with the model in order to reveal noted
deviations, if present. It is assumed that registered
deviations indicate the presence of a failure. Diag-
nosis is performed as a means for locating and
determining the potential causes of the registered
deviation. A number of different types of models are
utilized within model-based diagnostic systems [13].
These include, to name a few, simple dependency,
state-based, process, and causal models. A simple
dependency model illustrates the fact that the correct
working of one component depends on a number of
others; a tree of dependencies is created with the
most important components at the top of the tree.
With regards to state-based models, systems may be
characterized as a set of states; these states are linked
by transitions in order to illustrate their possible
movement within the application. Process models
contain modules that can be linked in order to
describe the system behaviour. This is useful within
systems where the processes that are occurring are
the most important feature. Causal models explicitly
represent the behaviour of the complete system or
device. Model-based diagnosis is most effective when
different devices are composed of the same compo-
nents. The user is required to determine which part
of the system, be it physical components or system
processes, are to be modelled. This paper applies a
fault diagnostics strategy to the fuel system of a
Boeing 777-200 aircraft. Thus, given the practical
application and process variables under considera-
tion, digraphs are used to model the system. The
diagnosis procedure is then based on the system
digraph.
This research work extends the research from
reference [14]. Here the method is applied to an
actual system, thus demonstrating the issue of scal-
ability. Explanation of the system considered is given
in section 2. In order to address the issue of adapt-
ability, identified in reference [14] as an avenue of
further investigation, diagnosis for two modes of
operation of the system, engine feed and pressure
refuel, are discussed. The procedure, involving model
construction and diagnosis itself, is demonstrated,
and the results yielded through automating the fault
diagnostics process are reviewed in sections 3 and 4.
Additional enhancements involve a revision of the
‘honing-in’ technique. These methods for honing in
on the most probable component at fault as well as
the specific failure mode of the component from the
complete list of fault causes are discussed in section
5. The diagnostic program in this paper takes
dynamic data into consideration and performs auto-
matic consistency checks between both consecutive
transmitter readings and between possible failure
modes and associated transmitter indications. The
dynamic aspect allows the modification of the entire
digraph structure depending on its operational phase,
thus allowing a greater scope for diagnosis. Final
conclusions of the research are given in section 6.
2 AIRCRAFT FUEL SYSTEM
2.1 System design
The Boeing 777-200 is a twinjet aircraft that entered
into revenue service in the middle of 1995. Fuel is
stored in three tanks: the left main, centre, and right
main. A surge tank is situated outboard of each main
tank, the function of which is to temporarily hold
fuel that flows owing to aircraft turns, thermal
expansion, or overfilling. The 777-200 fuel system
can hold a total of 117 400 : 35 200 l in each main
tank and 47 000 l in the centre tank. Figure 1 provides
an illustration of the left side of the Boeing 777-200
fuel system. The right side exhibits a similar struc-
ture. The engine feed operating mode is the primary
phase considered in this analysis, with a second
mode of pressure refuel, which incorporates a con-
trol aspect, also investigated.
2.2 System operating modes
2.2.1 Engine feed
The main purpose of the engine feed operating mode
is to supply fuel to the engines from the main and
centre tanks. Six powered fuel pumps supply fuel to
the engines. The engine feed operating mode is sub-
divided into five operational phases. The five phases
represent the manner in which engine feed can be
conducted.
• Phase one: fuel is pumped from the centre
tank into the engine feed manifold by the jet-
tison/override pumps.
• Phase two: once the centre tank is nearly empty,
fuel is pumped from the main tanks into the engine
feed manifold by the main tank boost pumps.
• Phases three and four: fuel can be transferred from
one wing to the other by opening one of the cross-
feed valves and shutting off the pumps on the side
to which fuel is being transferred.
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• Phase five: for cases whereby the fuel pumps are
switched off and the cross-feed valves are closed,
engine feed can occur through suction via the
suction bypass valves in the main tanks.
A mixture of sensors and switches are utilized in the
fuel system to provide system information regarding
flow, pressure, and tank levels. Those used for the
engine feed phase are described in Table 1 (in the
column headed ‘Variable’).
2.2.2 Pressure refuel
The main purpose of the pressure refuel operational
phase is to transfer fuel from the refuel adaptors to
the airplane tanks. The refuel system is operated
Fig. 1 Boeing 777-200 fuel system (left side)
Table 1 Engine feed phase monitoring variables
Engine feed phase
1 (CT feed) 2 (MT feed) 3 (cross-feed L–R)
4 (cross-feed
R–L)
5 (MT suction
feed)
Variable Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right
CT level > 0 > 0 6L2 and > 0 6L2 and >0 — — — — — —
MT level LSV LSV > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 >L2 >L2
Jettison/override pump switch On On Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off
Jettison/override pump
pressure light
Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off
Aft boost pump switch Off Off On On On Off Off On Off Off
Aft boost pump pressure light Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off
Forward boost pump switch Off Off On On On Off Off On Off Off
Forward boost pump pressure
light
Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off Off
Engine flow meter FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW FW
Spar valve switch (fuel control
switch)
Run Run Run Run Run Run Run Run Run Run
Spar valve and spar relay
position
AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR
Cross-feed valve 1 (CFV1) switch Off — Off — On — On — Off —
Cross-feed valve 1 and switch
position light
Off — Off — Off — Off — Off —
Cross-feed valve 2 (CFV2) switch Off — Off — On if CFV1C On if CFV1C Off —
Cross-feed valve 2 and switch
position light
Off — Off — Off — Off — Off —
CT, centre tank; MT, main tank; L2, level 2; FW, flow; AGR, agree; CFV1C, cross-feed valve 1 closed; LSV, load select value.
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using the integrated refuel panel on the left wing
where either manual or automatic refuel is selected.
In the case of manual refuel, the operator controls the
flow of fuel into the tanks by opening and closing the
refuel valves. During automatic refuel, the required
tank levels are set by the operator, and control loops
determine when the system should remove power
from the refuel valves, thus resulting in their closure.
The pressure refuel operating mode is divided into
two main phases and a single override phase. In
order to determine the behaviour of the system, tank
level readings and fault indicating methods, such as
valve lights and control switch positions, are used
(shown in Table 2, under column headed ‘Variable’).
Phase one. Fuel is pumped from the refuelling source
into the main and centre tanks via the refuel mani-
fold. While the tank levels are below their load select
value (LSV, the amount of fuel required as selected by
the operator) the refuel valves are expected to be
open with their respective refuel lights on. When
conducting manual refuel the operator is required to
turn the refuel valve control switches into the ‘Open’
position. The control switches are not utilized in the
automatic mode.
Phase two. Once the main and centre tanks reach
their respective LSVs the refuel valves are closed,
either by the operator during manual refuel or auto-
matically via the level control loop.
Override phase. Should fuel flow from either main
tank into their associated surge tanks and activate the
surge tank reed switches, a signal is transmitted to
remove power from all of the refuel valves. This
results in their closure and the non-transferral of fuel
from the refuel manifold to the main and centre
tanks.
2.3 Component failure modes
The component failure modes considered in the
analysis are shown in Table 3. It is assumed that the
stated failure modes may affect the functionality of
the aircraft fuel system. Each component failure
mode is allocated a code associated to a related
component identification tag.
Table 2 Pressure refuel mode monitoring variables
Pressure refuel phase
Manual Automatic
Variable Phase 1 Phase 2 Override Phase 1 Phase 2 Override
CT level <LSV LSV LSV <LSV LSV LSV
Left MT level (LMTL) <LSV LSV LSV, >LSV if RMTL¼LSV <LSV LSV LSV, >LSV if RMTL¼LSV
Right MT level (RMTL) <LSV LSV LSV, >LSV if LMTL¼LSV <LSV LSV LSV, >LSV if LMTL¼LSV
CT refuel valve control switch Open Closed — — — —
Left MT refuel valve control switch Open Closed — — — —
Right MT refuel valve control switch Open Closed — — — —
Left CT refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
Right CT refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
Left MT outboard refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
Left MT inboard refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
Right MT outboard refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
Right MT inboard refuel valve light On Off Off On Off Off
LSV, load select value; RMTL, right main tank level; LMTL, left main tank level.
Table 3 Component failure modes
Operating mode Component Failure mode
Engine feed and refuel Manifold Blocked, partially blocked, fractured
Engine feed Tank (centre and main) Fractured
Engine feed and refuel Pipe, flow tube Blocked, partially blocked, fractured
Engine feed Jettison isolation check valve Failed closed
Engine feed Pump Run, no run
Engine feed and refuel Spare valve, outlet float operated valve,
inlet float operated valve, outboard refuel valve,
inboard refuel valve, refuel valve, drain valve,
vacuum relief valve
Failed open, failed closed,
failed in intermediate position
Engine feed Cross-feed valve Failed open, failed closed
Refuel Refuel valve switch, refuel valve position switch Open (faulty), closed (faulty)
Refuel Surge tank float switch, tank unit Failed high, failed low
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3 THE DIGRAPH METHOD
3.1 Digraph description
A digraph is constructed from a set of nodes and
edges [15]. The nodes represent system process
variables and the edges connecting the nodes illus-
trate the interrelationships that exist between com-
ponents in a system. Nodes are also used to represent
component failure modes, whereby a signed edge
connecting a failure mode node to a process variable
node indicates the resulting disturbance caused by
the failure mode.
Digraph nodes contain an alphanumeric label
which symbolizes a specific process variable or
component failure mode. With regards to process
variable nodes, the precursor to the numeric section
indicates the type of process variable the node
represents, i.e. an M may be used to represent mass
flow. The numeric section of the label corresponds to
a precise location in the application system, i.e. M102
could represent the mass flow at location 102.
Process variable deviations are expressed as one of
five discrete values, þ10, þ1, 0, 1, and 10, corre-
sponding to large high, small high, normal, small low,
and large low deviations [16, 17].
A simple digraph is illustrated in Fig. 2. It can be
noted that M1 and M2, the nodes, are connected by
two edges. The alphanumeric code M1 represents
mass flow at location 1. The edge with a gain of þ1 is
considered to be the normal edge since this repre-
sents the relationship that is normally true; mass flow
at location 1 has a positive effect on mass flow at
location 2 (M2). The second edge in the illustration is
termed a conditional edge because its relationship is
only true whenever the condition represented by ‘:’
exists. It must be noted that only one edge is true at
any one time.
The standard method of constructing a digraph for
a system is followed in this research. It is from this
model that the diagnostic procedure has been
developed: it stems from the initial determination of
deviations from normal system operation. An unex-
pected process deviation within a system is repre-
sented by ‘highlighting’ the respective node in the
digraph. Subsequent propagation of the deviation
through the system is conducted by marking all of
the nodes affected by the initial highlighting. This
process, termed ‘back-tracing’, is described further in
section 3.2.
3.2 Diagnostic procedure
The procedure for diagnosis can be broken down into
three phases. The first involves the model construc-
tion, the second the diagnosis itself, with the third for
honing in on the actual fault cause. A generalized
procedure outlining the main steps involved in
developing a system digraph (phase 1) is provided.
1. System analysis. Firstly the system under inves-
tigation is defined. A specific number is allocated
to each component so generating a straightfor-
ward location reference approach for process
variables and component failure modes at a
given point. All relevant component failures of
the system are compiled. A failure mode code is
then attached to each fault. The system is also
separated into subunits and components.
2. Digraph generation. The unit digraph models for
the subunits, previously noted in step 1, are
generated. All process variable deviations that
could have an effect on the variables in the
model are taken into consideration. The extent of
the effect any disturbance may have on the sys-
tem with regards to the assigning of discrete
values is also noted. The system digraph is
formed by connecting common variables from
the subunit models.
The fault diagnostics process is conducted using the
system digraph (phase 2). System behaviour can be
monitored using data retrieved fromsensors. In a given
mode of operation the system would have a set of
expected sensor readings. These are compared with
the actual system readings during the diagnostics
procedure (steps 3 to 5) to identify the presence of any
deviations.
3. Determination of system deviations. The expected
system sensor readings are noted. The actual
sensor readings from the system are retrieved
and then compared with those expected to
determine the existence of any deviations.
4. Flagging of non-deviations. Non-deviating sensor
nodes in the digraph are ‘flagged’. It is assumed
that a non-deviating reading indicates the
absence of a failure.
5. Back-tracing process. If a sensor registers a
deviation then fault diagnosis involves back-
tracing through the system digraph from the node
that represents the location of the given devia-
tion. The back-tracing process ceases once either
(a) a flagged section is reached or (b) no more
back-tracing is possible. For multiple deviating
sensors the diagnostic results obtained through
back-tracing from each deviating node are
ANDed together. All potential fault causes
are listed at the end of the fault diagnostics
procedure.Fig. 2 A simple digraph
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Following the back-tracing process, often a list of
potential causes is produced; therefore the final stage
(phase 3) of the diagnostic procedure is to hone in on
the most probable fault cause. Three steps are
advised.
6. Identification of faulty component. Reduction
of the fault list is carried out by removing com-
ponent failure modes to identify solely the
component(s).
7. Specificity of component fault. Numerical rank-
ings are calculated using importance measures to
identify the most likely contributor to the system
deviation.
8. Evidence of fault. Data from maintenance logs
can be used to modify rankings to further hone in
on the problem source.
4 CASE STUDY – APPLICATION OF
DIAGNOSTICS APPROACH
4.1 Phase 1 – fuel system digraph development
With the system defined and component failure
modes identified, the next step involves generating the
system digraph. A digraph is generated for each oper-
atingmode. For the engine feed the fuel system is split
into three main sections: (a) cross-feed, left centre,
and main tank; (b) right centre; and (c) main tank. In
total, the system digraph for the engine feed phase is
constructed from 282 nodes, of which 88 are process
variable nodes and 194 are component failure mode
nodes. The unit digraphs for the centre andmain tanks
(left and right wings) are developed through a process
of building up from the tank levels nodes to the fuel
pumps, engine feed manifold, and spar valves at the
inlet to the engines. The cross-feed section digraph
encompasses the pipe-work and related valves that
connect the left and right engine feed manifolds.
With regards to the pressure refuel operating mode,
the system is divided into three groups: left wing
section, right wing section, and the third group – the
associated control loops and signal structure (control
loops are dealt with in a separate group owing to both
their importance within the pressure refuel operating
mode and the fact that there are numerous integrated
loop and signal structures present). In total the fuel
system digraph associated with the pressure refuel
operating mode is constructed from 228 nodes, of
which 50 are process variable nodes and 178 are
component failure mode nodes.
A section of the respective left main tank digraph
for the engine feed mode is presented in Fig. 3. This
depicts the relationship exhibited in a section of the
pipe-work incorporating a spar valve and suction
bypass valve in the left wing. Mass flow along the left
engine feed manifold is represented by the process
flow structure exhibited by nodes M48!M50. The
direction of flow in the manifold, and hence the
direction of the edges connecting the mass flow
nodes, is towards the spar valve which allows fuel to
pass to the left engine. There are three identical fail-
ure modes associated with the mass flow nodes that
represent the left engine feed manifold. Two failure
modes, left engine feed manifold fractured and par-
tially blocked (LMF, LMPB), result in a small negative
disturbance, and the left engine feed manifold
blocked (LMB) mode results in a large negative dis-
turbance. These disturbances are indicated by signing
the edges, connecting the failure mode nodes to the
process variable nodes, ‘1’ and ‘10’.
The left spar valve is denoted by the relationship
between nodes M49 and M50. If the spar valve is
closed then this normally positive relationship is
nullified, as indicated by the conditional edge signing
‘0: SPVL Closed’. There are three spar valve failure
modes that may result in a disturbance on mass flow
entering the left engine: spar valve open (SVLO), spar
valve closed (SVLC), and spar valve intermediate
position (SVLI). The failure modes would generate a
large positive, large negative, and small negative dis-
turbance respectively. These deviations are indicated
by the signs ‘þ10’, ‘10’ and ‘1’ on the edges con-
necting the failure mode nodes to M50. The node
SFCSW, fuel control switch node, and M50 illustrate
the control relationships from the pilot inputs for the
spar valve. If the switch is set to ‘run’ then the rela-
tionship is positive (þ1: FCSW RUN), else a negative
relationship is exhibited (1: FCSW NO RUN). A
more detailed explanation of the digraph section is
explained in reference [14].
4.2 Phase 2 – performing diagnostics
4.2.1 Observed and expected system behaviour
The method for performing system diagnostics using
digraphs is based on comparing system sensor read-
ings with those that would be expected while the
Fig. 3 Left main tank digraph section for engine feed mode
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system is in a known operating mode. The first step
therefore involves determining if any system variable
deviations exist. The presence of a deviation is con-
sidered indicative of a fault having occurred. It is
assumed that a non-deviating transmitter reading
indicates the absence of failure in its respective sec-
tion. Tables 1 and 2 show the expected readings for
the sensors in the system for each given mode of
operation.
4.2.2 Diagnostic considerations
A general diagnostic statement, which is applicable
to both the engine feed and pressure refuel modes,
regards the relationship between a switch and its
associated controlled device. Both the deviations and
non-deviations noted by the switch and sensors that
are located near the device are used to ‘hone in’ on
specific fault options. Further information is pro-
vided in reference [14].
All control aspects of the engine feed mode are
instigated through pilot–switch interfaces. The pilot
makes informed decisions based on the data retrieved
from the flow meters and tank levels, as well as the
indication lights. Consequently, when back-tracing
along the routes between the switches and controlled
components, there is no need to consider the paths
separately. Loop operators [17] need not be employed
since they do not form ‘complete’ control loops. This
is not, however, the situation during the pressure
refuel operating mode since upstream variables are
used by the system to regulate downstream variables
without the involvement of a human operator.
The control aspects associated with the pressure
refuel operating mode are subdivided into three
segments, one of which is completely manual and
instigated through an operator–switch interface while
the remaining two are automatic. During the manual
operation of the pressure refuel mode, the operator
conducts informed decisions based on retrieved tank
level data. As a result, when back-tracing along the
routes between the valve control switches and the
controlled components there is no need to consider
the paths separately. Conversely, during automatic
operation of the refuel mode a downstream variable,
the tank level, is used by the system to regulate the
refuel valves (upstream variables). Therefore, while
back-tracing through the negative feedback loop, the
loop must be considered as an entire entity. The third
‘control loop’ is related to the override function of the
surge tank level switches and consequently forms an
override control route as opposed to a loop. There-
fore, depending on the precise phase of the pressure
refuel operating mode, sections of the digraphs are
‘turned on and off’ accordingly. For example, should
the system be running in manual with all tank levels
below their LSVs and no noted refuel valve devia-
tions, the override and automatic refuel mode control
sections are disregarded.
4.2.3 Back-tracing
Where no deviation exists between the expected and
actual system behaviour the corresponding nodes in
the digraph, representing the relevant process vari-
ables, are ‘flagged’. Back-tracing commences from
the location of any noted deviations to determine the
possible fault causes. The process of back-tracing
ceases once a flagged node is reached or if no further
back-tracing can take place. A single faulty fuel sys-
tem scenario is used to illustrate the diagnostic cap-
ability of the fuel system digraph. The system is
assumed to be in phase 5 of the engine feed operating
mode. The retrieved readings note a single deviation
from those expected (highlighted in bold in the sub-
set of sensor readings shown in Table 4); ‘no flow’ is
registered by the left flow meter instead of ‘flow’. The
readings are retrieved at 30 s intervals.
The process of back-tracing is automated through
running scripted code in Matlab. The diagnostic
program can be subdivided into four main sections,
namely: input, comparison, fault diagnostics, and
output. These are discussed in detail in reference
[14]. The diagnostic results are displayed while the
program runs. Initial display features involve noting
the status of the fuel system sections with regards to
the presence or absence of any noted deviations. If
deviations are noted, the determined fault diagnostic
results are displayed on screen for each section.
When reading the retrieved actual data into the pro-
gram, results are output for each interval. For the first
three intervals it is noted that no deviations exist. A
deviation is recorded in the left wing during interval
four (t¼ 90 s).
Table 4 Expected and retrieved readings
Expected Retrieved (after 90 s)
Variable Left Right Left Right
Forward boost pump switch Off Off Off Off
Forward pressure light Off Off Off Off
Engine flow meter Flow Flow No flow Flow
Spare valve switch Run Run Run Run
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1. During the fault diagnostics process for interval
four, the right wing and cross-feed section flags
are signed ‘0’ while the left wing flag is signed ‘1’,
thus indicating the presence of a transmitter
deviation. Variable deviations are represented
using five discrete values [þ10, þ1, 0, 1, 10]
(noted in section 3.1). Taking into account the
example described in section 4.2.1, the deviation
‘no flow’ is registered as opposed to the expected
variable ‘flow’. Full flow and no flow are con-
sidered to be the maximal registered readings.
Therefore, the deviation ‘no flow’ in the example
is accounted for using ‘10’! large negative
deviation, where ‘10’ represents the magnitude.
Back-tracing commences from node M50(10)
and, given the stated operating mode phase,
considers the process flow structure in the
digraph that represents the left engine feed
manifold and suction bypass valve. Node M50
marks the location of the transmitter deviation at
the inlet to the left engine and ‘10’ takes into
account the magnitude of the registered devia-
tion. The back-tracing procedure ceases at the
main tank level node. The fault propagation can
be followed by referencing Fig. 4:
1. M50 (10)!LMB.
2. M50 (10)!M49 (10)!M40(10)!P40B,
BVLC.
The failure mode LMB is omitted in the fault
propagation M50!M49 since it has already been
determined from point 1 above. The back-tracing
sequence is thus simplified, as the full results list
‘LMBþLMBþP40BþBVLC’ would be reduced to
‘LMBþP40BþBVLC’. This simplification process is
automated within the diagnostic program.
Three diagnostic results are output by the program:
left engine feed manifold blocked (LMB), pipe 40
blocked (P40B), and left suction bypass valve closed
(BVLC). A fourth failure mode (SVLC) illustrated as
causing a large negative disturbance on flow at loca-
tion 50 (M50) in Fig. 4 is not listed. The spar valve is
not considered to have failed closed given that the
spar switch is in the ‘Run’ position and no warnings
have been issued to the pilot regarding a disagree-
ment between the spar valve and spar valve switch
positions. The final phase of diagnosis is discussed in
section 5.
4.3 Results
In order to test the diagnostic strategy, results for
single and multiple deviating transmitter readings
have been obtained for other example scenarios
covering the entire range of the engine feed and
pressure refuel operating modes. Ten test cases are
summarized in Table 5. The actual readings and the
number of failure modes determined are highlighted.
The ‘number of faults determined’ refers to the
number of faults obtained through the back-tracing
procedure for the specified test case. ‘First order’
indicates one fault, ‘second order’ two faults (multi-
ple failure), etc. It can be observed that often more
than one fault cause is identified. It should be noted
that the actual fault causes for the noted test cases
are obtained in these examples. The key issue high-
lighted is how to improve the distinguishability of the
diagnostic strategy. Two methods are discussed in
section 5. The addition of further transmitters into
the system would allow for increased isolability.
A compromise has to be found, though, between the
over-complexity issues involved in the addition
of further sensors and the precise identification of
failures.
When dealing with sensor readings to identify the
system behaviour the technique must be able to
overcome the issue of sensitivity. Thresholds for the
level, flow, and pressure readings are determined so
as to prevent ‘false alarms’ with regards to registered
deviations. In this application this has been sufficient
to produce valid results; however, a more advanced
technique may need to be investigated for differing
applications.
Caution must be exercised to ensure that the
model created of the system actually reflects the
physical system. With detailed piping and instru-
mentation illustrations, and using expert knowledge,
verification of the expected relationships has been
sought. While working with an actual system a period
of testing would need to be carried out to verify the
models created.
On dealing chiefly with mass flow relationships in
the fuel system the diagnostic back-tracing proce-
dure is sufficient since transmitter readings are taken
downstream of prospective failure locations. It may,
however, be necessary to consider ‘forward-tracing’Fig. 4 Back-tracing illustration
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when reviewing applications with numerous complex
relationships which span across subsystems.
With the inclusion of the second operating mode of
refuel the method ultimately illustrates the potential
for application to an actual aircraft fuel system
comprising a built-in control loop structure, thus
addressing some of the issues surrounding scalability
of the method. By breaking the operating mode into
separate sections this has prevented the generation of
unwieldy models.
5 LOCATION AND SPECIFICITY OF FAULT
Current diagnostic results produced from the pro-
gram often include a multitude of possible causes.
Research has focused on three ways to reduce this list
and identify the most likely cause, if not actual cause,
of the system deviation (phase 3 of the diagnostic
process). The first method (section 5.1) considers an
approach to identify the component at fault, to direct
maintenance engineers to the source of the problem.
The second (section 5.2) looks at using mathematical
techniques combined with component failure and
repair statistics to highlight the most likely compo-
nent failure mode combination. The final method
involves reviewing current maintenance logs to
adjust the rankings in accordance with the support-
ing evidence on the possible problem source.
5.1 Determining the component at fault
The first method is based on the principle of retrieving
the diagnostic results from the full analysis, and then
reducing the list through removing the component
failure modes and simply listing the components
Table 5 Ten test case results
Test case Operating mode Registered deviations No. of faults determined
1 Engine feed Left main tank 2:
Flow meter: no flow 1 first order
1 second order
2 Engine feed Left main tank 36:
Forward boost pump pressure light: on 4 first order
Aft boost pump pressure light: on 16 second order
Flow meter: no flow 16 third order
3 Engine feed Left centre tank 6:
Level transmitter: static level 3 first order
3 second order
4 Engine feed Left main tank 1:
Cross-feed valve 1 switch position light: on 1 first order
5 Engine feed Right main tank 28:
Forward boost pump pressure light: on 4 first order
Aft boost pump pressure light: on 8 second order
Flow meter: reduced flow 16 third order
Left main tank
Flow meter: reduced flow
6 Pressure refuel Left main tank 4:
Level transmitter: static level 4 second order
Inboard refuel light: off
Outboard refuel light: off
7 Pressure refuel Right centre tank 2:
Refuel light: off 2 first order
8 Pressure refuel Centre tank 4:
Level transmitter: low rate of level increase 3 first order
Left main tank 1 second order
Level transmitter: static level
9 Pressure refuel Centre tank 1:
Level transmitter: static level 1 second order
Right main tank
Level transmitter: static level
Inboard refuel light: off
Outboard refuel light: off
Left main tank
Level transmitter: static level
Inboard refuel light: off
Outboard refuel light: off
10 Pressure refuel Centre tank 16:
Level transmitter: static level 9 second order
Right main tank 6 third order
Level transmitter: static level 1 fourth order
Left main tank
Level transmitter: static level
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that may be faulty. It is assumed that the operator
conducting the diagnostic analysis is primarily inter-
ested in the actual component that is known to be
faulty. For example, if pipe X is noted as either leaking
or ruptured, it is pipe X that is of significance as
opposed to the definitive failure mode. Inspection of
this identified component will then yield the actual
failure mode. The reduction procedure is applied to a
test case as a means of exemplifying the proposed
process.
5.1.1 Engine feed test case
The diagnostic results retrieved from application of
the digraph approach yield 4 second-order fault
combinations and 16 combinations of both the
orders three and four. Through considering the
removal of specific failure modes and simply listing
the relevant components, the fault list is cut to 12
multiple faults, 4 of the orders two, three, and four.
The revised list is thus presented
(Order 1) ABL.FBL, ABL.P59, FBL.P58, P58.P59
(Order 2) LM.ABL.FBL LM.ABL.P59, LM.FBL.P58,
LM.P58.P59
(Order 3) ABL.FBL.P55.P56, ABL.P59.P55.P56,
FBL.P58.P55.P56, P55.P56.P58.P59
where: LM is left manifold; ABL is left aft boost pump;
FBL is left forward boost pump; P55, P56, P58, and
P59 are pipes 55, 56, 58, and 59.
From the test case it is noted that, depending on
the precise component failure modes retrieved for
the scenario under investigation, the reduction pro-
cess can have a noticeable effect. However, on some
occasions the number of fault combinations listed is
not reduced. This is due to the fact that the failure
modes retrieved from the initial analysis are all
associated with separate components. For scenarios
where the reduction process is applicable, it is effec-
tive in reducing the diagnostic list previously yielded.
5.2 Determining the most probable failure
mode cause
A method that has been developed to identify the
most probable failure mode cause is to use reliability
theory [18]. Unavailability functions and importance
measures are utilized in order to rank the failure
combinations yielded accordingly. It is assumed that
the repair process would be initiated once a failure is
revealed and therefore the unavailability is given by
QðtÞ ¼ l
l þ n ð1  e
ðlþ nÞtÞ ð1Þ
where l is failure rate, n is repair rate, and t is time.
Generic failure rate data [19] are employed in equa-
tion (1) as a means of defining the fuel system
component’s unavailability. For the example given in
section 4.2.3, the unavailability of the relevant com-
ponents was found to be: LMB, 1.69 · 107; BVLC,
5 · 108; P40B, 3 · 1010. The Fusell–Vesely measure
of minimal cut set importance provides a means of
ranking the cut sets obtained from the system
digraph. The expression for the Fusell–Vesely mea-
sure is illustrated by
Ii ¼ PðCiÞ
QSYSðqðtÞÞ ð2Þ
The importance measure is defined as the probability
of occurrence of cut set i [P(Ci)] given that the system
has failed. QSYS is calculated using the rare event
approximation as opposed to calculating an exact
value. For the given example, no difference was noted
in the ranking of the cut sets when considering either
the rare event or exact values for QSYS. For cases
whereby many cut sets are produced, it would be
computationally demanding to determine an exact
value for QSYS.
For the example, the cut set importance measures
were found to be (QSYS¼ 2.20 · 107): LMB,
7.71 · 101; BVLC, 2.28 · 101; P40B, 1.37 · 103. From
the results the most likely cause for the given devia-
tion at the inlet to the left engine flow meter is noted
as a blockage in the left engine feed manifold. In
addition, this method of ranking can be combined
with the reduced list of failed components developed
in section 5.1.
5.3 Evidence of component fault
Each aircraft has a complete technical log, which
consists of three volumes: an aircraft technical log;
a cabin discrepancy log; and an in-flight entertain-
ment defect log. This technical log reflects the
current status of defects, repairs, replacements,
adjustments, and inspections while the aircraft is in
service. The entries placed in the log form a perma-
nent part of the aircraft records. The extension to the
honing-in method proposed considers information
contained in the aircraft technical log. The approach
is applicable once the initial analysis, based on
reliability theory, has been conducted. Throughout
the analysis it is assumed that the aircraft holds a
valid Certificate of Airworthiness and all relevant
maintenance checks have been conducted before
departure. The proposed extension procedure to be
followed is:
(a) the ‘defect’ section of the Sector Record is refer-
enced;
(b) the list of defect descriptions is cross-referenced
with the ranked failure combinations; any failure
combinations that are not associated with the
noted defects are initially masked;
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(c) the action taken by maintenance personnel is
then researched; from the noted defects in the
technical log it is possible to re-rank the cut sets
accordingly;
(d) for scenarios involving fault combinations that
are not associated with the entered defects,
technical engineering knowledge of the system
must be used to locate the actual system fault
within the ranked results list, previously obtained
using reliability theory.
The extension method is based upon the pre-
sumption that ‘Nil defects’ is not entered in the
defect section of the Sector Record. In order to illus-
trate how the maintenance log information may be
used, consider the example where upon imple-
mentation of the previous honing-in mechanism the
failures are ranked in the order:
(a) LMB (left manifold blocked);
(b) P56B.P55B (pipes at locations 56 and 55 blocked).
From the aircraft technical log it is noted that: (a) the
aircraft recently underwent a scheduled maintenance
review during which the left spar valve in the engine
feed manifold was replaced along with partial mani-
fold resealing work; (b) there are no deferred fuel
system defects listed; (c) daily and pre-departure
checks revealed no fuel system defects.
Since the noted fuel system repair work was con-
ducted on components associated with the engine
feed manifold, the most probable fault cause is
deemed to be a blockage in the left manifold. It
is likely that a foreign object, left by maintenance
after undertaking repairs, resulted in the blockage. In
this case both the initial honing-in mechanism and
the extension using logs list ‘LMB’ as the most
probable fault cause. Here the technical log has
provided supporting evidence; for other instances it
may reweight component failure modes as more or
less probable. Incorporation of this information to
form a fully automated procedure would be of further
benefit.
6 CONCLUSION
The fuel system digraph noticeably reflects the phy-
sical structure of the system under investigation, thus
providing a clear representation of the relationships
that exist between the system variables. The com-
plete digraph for the fuel system is relatively large in
terms of the number of nodes from which the
digraph is constructed. The development process is,
however, greatly aided by dividing the system into
subunits and operating modes.
The potential for the presence of anomalies
between failure mode results is eradicated through
incorporating ‘flagging’ into the diagnostics process.
‘Flagging’ is considered a consistency check and
therefore removes the possibility of conflicting
results arising between non-deviating transmitter
nodes and the failure results achieved through
back-tracing from nodes noting specific deviations.
This process has been adapted further when con-
sidering the five defined phases of the engine feed
operating mode, in addition to the alternative oper-
ating mode of refuel. Depending on the specific
phase and mode of operation, sections of the system
digraph are effectively turned ‘on’ or ‘off’ accord-
ingly. This therefore dictates the route to be followed
when back-tracing from a deviating node.
The use of reduction in failure combination lists
helps to hone in on the specific component at fault,
and the use of reliability theory permits the pre-
sentation of a numerical solution to determine the
most likely fault cause for a given deviation. In this
manner it is possible to provide a complete list of the
fault causes yielded through back-tracing, while also
highlighting the location of the fault, i.e. the problem
component, and also indicating the actual fault that
is considered to have occurred. The use of main-
tenance logs further helps to provide evidence of the
exact cause of the fault. This development builds on
previous research where a honing-in mechanism was
cited as necessary when considering faulty scenarios
that yield numerous diagnostic results. Ultimately
examination of the system may be required to
determine the exact fault cause in some instances.
Current research considers a range of phases and
operating modes and deals with multiple faults.
Furthermore, real-time diagnosis is allowed for
through computer analysis. Control loop operators
have been employed during the fault diagnostics
process when taking into account the control loop
associated with the refuel mode, thus demonstrating
the feasibility of this technique as a fault diagnostic
method.
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